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Keep calm and carry on
Reflections on the Anglosphere
The Anglosphere—shorthand for the Anglo-American sphere of influence—established 
the concept and structure of the modern transnational community and remains salient in 
contemporary international relations. For Australia, the Anglosphere provides a framework for 
continued prosperity through strong trade and political favours between those within its fold. 
It facilitates an Australian Defence Force with credible maritime projection capability. In ANZUS, 
its nuclear umbrella provides deterrence against nuclear attack. 
The Anglosphere (in the narrow sense of the former British Empire, including Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, and the US) has been the architect and a staunch proponent of international 
norms. The intergovernmental organisation is one of the Anglosphere’s lasting gifts to the world. 
The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and other multilateral international strategic functions owe their existence to the emergence 
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2 Keep calm and carry on: reflections on the Anglosphere
of global governance. While membership of those bodies extends well beyond the English-speaking 
world, the Anglosphere has incubated and hatched the institutional norms and philosophies that 
continue to dominate the international political economy. 
Over the past few centuries it’s been Britain and the US, through industrialisation and naval power, 
that have been able to dominate the world’s markets and oceans, and thus to export their systems 
and cultural norms to the world by sea, then by air, and now digitally. Today there are clear challenges 
to Anglospheric dominance, and new and emerging powers are reading the ‘road rules’ for success 
in navigating international relations and are sometimes reinterpreting or even rewriting them. The 
extent to which they’re redefining them is debated in this collection of blog posts. 
A range of non-Anglo players now have an active role in the Anglosphere. Many European nations, 
for example, have quite happily adopted the globalised norms for themselves. Elsewhere, newly 
developed states in Asia, the BRIC nations and alternative international axes like the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation are bringing their own flavour to the international architecture. 
At the centre of this collection is the debate over the impact a rising China and other developing Asian 
states will have on the nature of the Anglosphere in the Asia–Pacific. The interdependence between 
the Chinese and American economies provides a unique context to discuss the contemporary nature 
of the Anglosphere in Asia. The crux is the extent to which China will integrate itself into the existing 
global order, versus its desire to rewrite the rules to suit itself. China’s burgeoning power in the 
current global economic context may give it the ability to match, or even supersede, the influence of 
the Anglosphere in the Asia–Pacific. This means Australia must potentially recalibrate its strategic 
thinking if it’s to maximise the value of its defence arrangements and its political and economic stake 
in the region.
The rise of Asia is challenging some much-cherished Anglospheric notions, such as classic maritime 
strategy. Seminal 19th century American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan saw naval projection 
capability as the primary vehicle for expanding and protecting dominion and, indeed, naval power 
projection capability underpinned Western geopolitical approaches. Today, the ability of the US and 
its allies to project naval power is under challenge from China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy, 
which in turn has led to the development of the AirSea Battle concept in response.
This collection of blog posts doesn’t aim to justify the existence of the Anglosphere, but instead 
discusses its current shape and its relevance in the Asian century and to our current world order. 
In the age of multipolarity, the proliferation of sophisticated weaponry and greater access to 
information technology, the Anglosphere can’t control how it is reimagined, redefined and re-created 
in the Asia–Pacific region. Thanks to globalised communications technology, the health and security 
of intelligence-sharing arrangements such as Five Eyes and the Five Powers Defence Arrangements 
need not suffer the tyranny of distance so acutely, but aren’t impervious to attack either—not least 
in cyberspace. 
The harbinger of this Anglosphere series was written by Hugh White, professor of strategic studies 
and former head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. 
It was published in The Age on 9 July 2013. The crux of his argument is that adapting to China’s rise 
will necessarily mean ‘overturning all kinds of comfortable assumptions about Australia’s place in 
the world’. 
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Subsequent responses were published on ASPI’s blog, The Strategist—a talking post for discussion 
of contemporary Australian strategic policy. Peter Jennings, Executive Director of ASPI, was first 
in—arguing that there’s no alternative to the structure that the Anglosphere provides in international 
political and economic relations, that there’s no credible challenger to its dominance, and that 
China’s rise to regional primacy isn’t inevitable.
Nic Stuart, political columnist, joins the conversation by taking us on a journey with Persian Emperor 
Darius I all the way to contemporary Australia, pointing out that Australia’s military still reflects a 
monocultural yesteryear. He suggests that Anglo-Australia’s conception of the Anglosphere also 
rests there.
White weighs in again with the perennial question: what will happen when wealth and power are 
no longer concentrated in Anglo-Saxon hands? Jennings responds by reminding us that China has 
bought into the Anglospheric trading system and done quite well from it, and that there’s no reason 
why the Anglosphere’s international order will not continue to prevail.
Graeme Dobell, ASPI’s journalist fellow, sketches the (rather unseemly) mental image of a Pavlovian 
response to Tony Abbott’s spruiking of the Anglosphere, and the potential damage it could do to 
Australia’s international and regional reputation. Andrew Smith, independent researcher, says that 
Australia has earned its stripes in the ‘inner sanctum’ of the Anglosphere, and now it should use its 
influence to engage Asia and invite others into the realm of the blessed few. This should ensure the 
Anglosphere’s longevity, in whatever form it takes.
Andrew Davies, senior analyst for defence capability at ASPI and executive editor of The Strategist, 
tries to understand where Hugh White and Peter Jennings part company—and why. The answer, he 
suspects, is that both protagonists like the status quo, but disagree to a marked degree about the 
costs of trying to continue to assert it—Jennings thinks it’s a low-cost option, but White thinks that 
the cost–benefit calculus is much murkier.
Anglo-Australians, for the most part, no longer reflect with misty eyes on their British heritage 
when they consider their identity, according to Dobell’s next post. But looking around, he argues, 
Australians realise that they live in a big continent with a sparse population, and this explains a 
tendency to fear and xenophobia. Such perspectives inform defence and policy considerations of 
Australia’s place in the Anglosphere compared with its place in Asia.
Jennings returns to the debate by drawing a parallel between the Anglosphere and the ‘Five Eyes 
relationship’, highlighting its concrete benefits as a working relationship, as opposed to the less 
tangible rewards of being part of a ‘concert of Asia’. Dobell then aligns with Jennings’ observations of 
China accepting (but not necessarily adopting) the ‘international rules of the road’ in the economic 
realm, which have facilitated China’s growth. But not so for the ‘Anglospheric tradition of war’, 
which Dobell considers in Part II of his post: most Australians are happy with their way of life, but 
apprehension abounds if they’re pressed to fight an Anglospheric-type war to preserve it. 
There’s no consensus answer in this collection of writings. But arguing’s half the fun—and a very 
Anglospherical thing to do.
- Sarah Norgrove
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Foreign policy is Kevin Rudd’s forte—isn’t It? 
Hugh White 
Until last week, foreign policy was a winner for Tony Abbott. A recent Lowy Institute poll showed 
two-thirds of voters preferred the Coalition to look after Australia’s interests overseas. That shows 
Julia Gillard’s weakness in the field, not Abbott’s strength. He has said very little about foreign policy, 
and almost nothing of any substance. He’s had a free ride.
But now he faces Kevin Rudd, and the free ride is over. Rudd’s warning that Abbott’s promise to tow 
asylum-seekers back to Indonesia could spark an armed clash was crude and risky, but it did draw 
effective attention to the hollowness of Abbott’s slogan. Likewise Rudd’s trip to Jakarta last weekend.
Although light on substance, it was weighty enough to show up Abbott’s empty claim to have a 
foreign policy ‘focused on Jakarta’. Somehow Gillard never managed to do that.
In fact to judge from what little he has said about it, Abbott’s foreign policy is a long way from being 
Jakarta-focused, or even Asia-focused. He talks little about Asia, and plays down the political 
and strategic significance of China’s rise, predicting in his book Battlelines that it would make no 
difference to Australia’s foreign policy.
Instead his deepest commitment is to the ‘Anglosphere’—the agreeable idea that the world should 
continue to be run primarily from Washington and London, by people just like us. In Washington last 
year he went so far as to say that ‘few Australians would regard America as a foreign country’. That 
is a very strange thing for a national leader to say. Indeed for sheer sentimental silliness it ranks with 
Gillard’s words to Congress: ‘America can do anything.’
There is no evidence of deep reflection behind either leader’s words. Abbott seems as uninterested 
in foreign policy as Gillard was. Like most both post-Vietnam, post-Cold War politicians, they take a 
favourable international environment for granted, and see foreign policy mostly as an opportunity for 
political positioning.
Rudd is very different. He really does know more about foreign policy than anyone else in 
Australian politics, and he returns to the prime ministership with incomparably better-informed, 
better-developed, better-articulated ideas about Australia’s international setting than either Gillard 
or Abbott.
In particular, over the past 18 months Rudd has been steadily setting out a radical new vision of Asia’s 
strategic future. In a series of speeches around the world he has analysed the risks and challenges of 
escalating strategic rivalry between the US and China, and explained what should be done about it.
He argues that Asia’s peace and stability in the Asian Century cannot be based on solely American 
primacy—Pax Americana, as he calls it - or on Chinese-dominated Pax Sinica, but on a Pax Pacifica in 
which both America and China, along with other countries, will have to play leading roles—to share 
leadership, in other words.
This might seem like ordinary common sense, but it is very different from what either the Gillard 
government or the Abbott opposition have been saying—or the Obama White House, for that matter. 
They have all clung to the idea that the Pax Americana will survive in Asia indefinitely despite the rise 
of China and other new Asian powers.
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Pretending that Asia’s strategic order is immutable might keep Australians feeling relaxed and 
comfortable. But it precludes us from any role in shaping the momentous changes that are already 
under way, and that will have a profound effect on Australia’s future. This is the most important and 
risky shift in Australia’s international setting in a generation, but among our political leaders only 
Rudd—and on the other side, Malcolm Turnbull—are taking it seriously. 
All this should make Rudd overwhelmingly the better choice as Prime Minister as far as foreign policy 
is concerned. But with Rudd nothing is ever that simple. Back in 2007 he came to office with lots of 
fresh ideas about how to position Australia in Asia, but after four years in office, as Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister, Rudd had done very little. Some modest achievements on marginal issues were 
overshadowed by major failures on things that really matter.
Rudd’s foreign policy went wrong for the same reasons that caused his government as a whole to fail. 
There were too many initiatives, too little preparation and too little follow-through, turbo-charged by 
a slightly deranged egocentricity that fed an illusion that he belonged at centre stage on every issue, 
no matter what he actually had to contribute.
Above all, the genuine policy thinker and hyperactive egoist also turned out to be a very timid 
politician. Rudd’s interesting policy ideas fell victim to his desire to tell the public what he thought 
they wanted to hear. Nowhere was this clearer than on the key issue of China, where his strengths 
and weaknesses showed most starkly. Rudd understands China and what it means for Australia as 
well as anyone. But adapting to China’s rise means overturning all kinds of comfortable assumptions 
about Australia’s place in the world. For Australia today, leadership on foreign policy means above 
all explaining to Australians how their world has changed. That means telling some hard truths. Last 
time around Rudd was not willing to do that. Unless he does better this time, all his expertise will be 
no use to him, or to us.
Originally published in The Age, 9 July 2013. Reproduced with permission.
Alliances: three cheers for the Anglosphere
Peter Jennings
Almost inevitably, I find myself disagreeing with another column by Hugh White, this time in The Age 
newspaper of 9 July, in which he damns the foreign policy of the Gillard government, condemns the 
poverty of Tony Abbott’s thought on the issue and praises the perspicacity of Kevin Rudd, because he 
‘understands’ the effect of strategic change in Asia.  That’s a target rich environment, but I’ll limit my 
rebuttal to just one aspect of Hugh’s piece, his casual dismissal of the Anglosphere:
 [Abbott’s] deepest commitment is to the ‘Anglosphere’—the agreeable idea that the world should 
continue to be run from Washington and London, by people just like us.  In Washington last year 
he went so far as to say that ‘few Australians would regard America as a foreign country’.  This is a 
very strange thing for a national leader to say.  Indeed for sheer sentimental silliness it ranks with 
Gillard’s words to Congress: ‘America can do anything’.
A more cursory dismissal of a core Australian strategic interest would be hard to find, although it 
has to be said that the Anglosphere is one of those international institutions about which it’s cool to 
sneer. So old fashioned. So, well, English.  How can this relic of an old order have a place in the Asian 
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Century? The short answer is because the Anglosphere demonstrates itself time and time again to 
be the engine of global order and the essential enforcer of international stability, even at a time of 
sweeping strategic change.
Strategists tend not to use the term Anglosphere unless they’re trying to cast someone or something 
in a rather negative way—all Robert Menzies and golden afternoon light. A more modern term is the 
Five Eyes community, which refers to the post Second World War intelligence collecting and sharing 
relationship developed between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. Depending on the strategic issue being discussed, NATO and Japan might be added to 
the list, the point of commonality being that we’re talking about the capitalist democracies which 
support open trading systems and the international rule of law. This is the group which, in different 
configurations and with occasional drop-outs, provided the core of military force needed to support 
Western (another derided term) interests from the Korean War up to the current Afghanistan conflict.
When strategists talk about the ‘international system’ they’re primarily discussing an order created 
and maintained by the Anglosphere and a small number of like-minded countries. That’s the same 
order which created the basis for economic growth in Asia and elsewhere; the same norms of 
domestic and international behaviour that best deliver innovation and productivity growth, and thus 
the life-styles that individuals in developing countries want to copy. If there’s a need for a coalition of 
countries to impose order or reduce risk in Kosovo, or Iraq, or Timor, or Afghanistan or Libya, or Mali, 
then the world looks to the Anglosphere or its allies to lead the task.
Perhaps more prosaically, the Five Eyes community offers a cost-effective defence framework for 
Australia. This makes it possible for us to be part of a highly effective intelligence grouping without 
having to maintain the burden of constellations of self-funded satellites, and to have access to 
military technology of a standard that couldn’t be developed indigenously. The Anglosphere makes 
it possible for Australia to operate a defence force and prosecute a sophisticated strategic policy that 
we would have no chance of matching based solely on our own resources. It’s for that reason that all 
Australian Prime Ministers, not just Gillard and (possibly) Tony Abbott, but also Rudd and the rest, 
have supported the Anglosphere, even though some have found it hard to utter the term for reasons 
of tribalism or trendiness.
Even if some might concede that the Anglosphere has served a useful purpose one could argue that 
the grouping’s run its historical course and that we must now look to new bringers of international 
order. This is presumably what Hugh thinks Mr Rudd understands, more’ than anyone else in 
Australian politics’:
 [Rudd] argues that Asia’s peace and stability in the Asian Century cannot be based on solely 
American primacy … but on a Pax Pacifica in which both America and China, along with other 
countries, will have to play leading roles—to share leadership, in other words.
Rudd and White would probably part company on some key points, however. Rudd has, in fact, been 
a particularly strong advocate of what the Anglosphere delivers in substance, if not in name. His 
2009 Defence White Paper championed a strengthened ADF maritime capability designed primarily 
for coalition (that is, five eyes and like-minded countries) operations. Rudd was also the most 
enthusiastic supporter of enhanced defence cooperation with the United States Marine Corps and Air 
Force. Rudd’s model of regional cooperation, in other words, is based on the strong involvement of 
Anglospheric countries. Strong militaries make for confident neighbours.
The Rudd approach suggests that it isn’t time to ditch the Anglosphere. Five factors militate against 
doing anything that would weaken the current international dispensation in the Asia-Pacific. First, 
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there’s no alternate model which offers an attractive way to manage regional security, or to transition 
to a regional, power sharing arrangement; no Sinosphere, for example. Second, there’s no other set 
of countries willing and able to take on a regional security enforcement role.  China has dipped a 
metaphoric toe in the water via anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden, but has showed little signs 
of wanting to shape an international order outside of its own territorial claims.
Third, no country in the Asia-Pacific, excepting perhaps North Korea, would comfortably welcome 
China taking on such a role anyway. Even the most muted attempts to assert a Sinosphere—such as 
we saw in 2009 and 2010  when China practiced a more assertive diplomacy over its South China Sea 
claims—served only to push ASEAN countries closer to Washington. Fourth, the current international 
order as applied to the Asia-Pacific is largely welcomed, including by China as the lead beneficiary 
of the growth which stability has promoted. Fifth, the US shows no sign of going away—it has added 
significant extra emphasis to its regional military, diplomatic economic and political engagement.  
We don’t need to redesign what isn’t broken.
Having recently debated Hugh about his ‘China Choice’ argument, I imagine he might by now be 
saying, ‘But at some point Peter, your assumptions won’t hold, and we have to be ready for that 
moment, when the US will be relatively less capable vis-a-vis China’. My view is that there’s no such 
inevitability about China’s long term rise to Sinospheric dominance. The current trends suggest that 
the US and China will indeed manage their relations to mutual benefit. The Anglosphere—or more 
accurately the international system it bequeathed—will remain the dominant paradigm, perhaps 
taking on some Chinese characteristics.
Originally published in The Strategist  10 July 2013.
 
Where, exactly, is the Anglosphere?
Nic Stuart 
There are all sorts of reasons that the Persian Emperor Darius I finally decided he’d had enough 
and prepared to invade Greece. After all, it was probably just a matter of time before the noisy, 
quarrelsome inhabitants of that rugged, mountainous and impoverished backwater finally came to 
the attention of the most powerful man the world had ever seen.
Today we think of Darius the Great as Persian but, as ruler of the Achaemenid Empire, he was hailed 
as ruler throughout the known world—from Egypt to Iran; from Thrace to Scythia. The key primary 
source ‘document’ of his reign is actually a massive inscription carved, high up on a rock cliff, on the 
old road to Babylon. It’s 15 metres high by 25 meters wide—but the key point for us is that, just like 
the Rosetta Stone, it’s a proclamation in three languages: Persian, Babylonian and Elamite. Darius’ 
Empire was so great that translation was necessary to ensure that he was understood.
The Greeks by contrast (and despite a common language) never really managed to achieve any 
lasting power greater than the city-state1. About the only thing that ever united this collection of 
warring towns was their enjoyment of plotting against each other or the presence of a common 
enemy, Persia.
The Greeks found ingenious ways to communicate with one another. During the First Persian War, for 
example, one leader needed to send a message encouraging another to revolt. He shaved the head 
of a slave, tattooed the instruction on his scalp, waited for the hair to grow back, and then sent the 
helpless man as a present to a general serving with the Persians. When this bizarre instruction was 
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received the Greeks knew what to do. They sprang their trap, captured the foreign admirals, and 
‘damaged Darius in every way’.
Effective I’m sure, but civilised? Well, not even an example of petty scheming such as this was capable 
of convincing the Greeks they were anything other than the Gods’ gift to the world. After all, they’d 
tried understanding the strange words foreigners spoke but it was all just ‘bar, bar, bar’ as far as they 
were concerned. Hence their word for the uncultured. βαρβαροι ‘Barbarians’.
A hundred years ago it would have been unnecessary to translate from the original Greek for a 
sophisticated audience such as this. Today, alas, we are undone! People simply don’t understand the 
meaning of words such as λυω2. Less than a century ago Australians were bound together by much 
more than a common language. Shared cultural experiences, like reading Billy Bunter, Jeeves and 
conjugating ancient tongues3, united people in a specific part of the Anglosphere. But there was no 
certainty things would turn out like this.
Two hundred years ago, in 1814, the British were burning the White House. Go back one hundred 
years and the king/emperors of the UK and Germany were cousins. We boasted then of our common 
Anglo-Saxon Teuton stock and noted that ‘blood was thicker than water’. Even as recently as 1940, 
there was absolutely no guarantee the US would enter the Second World War.4
America didn’t fight alongside Britain at Suez; the UK abandoned first France, and later the US (and 
Australia) in Vietnam. The English speaking peoples may be willing to go to war for their own interests, 
but they’re notoriously unwilling to prop up the foreign entanglements of others. Hugh White has 
a point: there’s nothing inevitable about countries with a common language sharing a strategic 
outlook. Our physical environments are different for a start and there’s no guarantee that culture will 
necessarily trump geography.
But it did, mostly, for the Greeks and that’s where Peter Jennings’ piece is absolutely correct. He 
emphasises the continuing strength of the community of people who use English—even if we do it 
simply in order to argue with one another more precisely. As Winston Churchill said, we’re more often 
‘divided by a common language’ than united by one.
However, look around you and you’ll see Australia is fast becoming a new society. Bertie Wooster’s 
brilliant insights into the correct way to treat servants are no longer appreciated by the likes of (to 
pick an example completely at random) my wife. Now you may well find this utterly inexplicable. 
Nevertheless, allow me to assure you there are times when it indeed appears as if she’s treating me 
like the common help!
But our military still physically represents the Australia of more than three decades ago5. Last time 
I was in Afghanistan, for example, I only saw four ethnically Asian-Aussie diggers. Wander down to 
growing centres like Chatswood or Box Hill and the scenery is very different. Cohesion is vital, not 
just in fighting units but also in society. Mark Thompson’s recent ASPI’s Budget Brief emphasised the 
dangers of monoculturalism when he referred to the significant ‘over-representation of Anglo-Celtic 
born individuals’ in the forces. He went on to warn ‘there’s something unsettling about a defence 
force that’s unrepresentative of the society it seeks to protect’.
It seems likely we may find that a concept like the Anglosphere, so comfortable today, doesn’t fit 
quite so well tomorrow. Perhaps it might just be better to focus on being Australian.
Oi, Oi, Oi!
Originally published in The Strategist 12 July 2013.
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Sunset for the Anglosphere?
Hugh White
Peter Jennings has sprung to defend the Anglosphere from my disparagement. But before battle 
begins, let’s clarify what exactly he’s defending, because Peter uses the term ‘Anglosphere’ in 
several rather different ways. Some of them I wouldn’t dream of disparaging, and others I suspect he 
wouldn’t really want to defend.
The sense of ‘Anglosphere’ that I would least want to disparage is what we might call the Tennysonian 
one. This sense clearly looms large for Tony Abbott. In the Heritage Foundation speech6 mentioned 
in my column, Abbott quoted lines from Tennyson that I’ve always loved, which describe Britain [or 
perhaps England] as ‘a land of just and old renown/ where freedom broadens slowly down/ from 
precedent to precedent’. If the Anglosphere means nothing more than reverence for Britain’s deep-
rooted legal and constitutional traditions then I wouldn’t disparage it for a moment.
Nor do I disparage the second sense which Peter attributes to the Anglosphere when he identifies it 
with the ‘five-eyes’ Anglo-Saxon intelligence sharing arrangements from which Australia benefits so 
handsomely. I’m all for that.
But Peter slides from those meanings to some very different ones. He says the Anglosphere is ‘the 
engine of global order and the essential enforcer of international stability’. Really there are two claims 
here. One is that the Anglosphere has created the global order as it is today. Tony Abbott believes this: 
in his Heritage speech Abbott said ‘Given America’s role, it can’t quite be said that the modern world 
has been made in England but it’s certainly been shaped in English’. But really, if we’re talking about 
the last century, and certainly the last seventy-five years, it isn’t the Anglosphere that’s created and 
upheld the modern order, but America. Talk of the Anglosphere is just a way for we smaller Anglos to 
bask in America’s glory.
The other claim is that it’s the Anglosphere that upholds international order today. Peter 
acknowledges that the Anglos alone do not do this. He expands the Anglosphere to take in NATO 
and Japan. This group—‘the Anglosphere and its allies’—includes ‘the capitalist democracies which 
support open trading systems and the international rule of law’. So now we are not really talking 
about the Anglosphere at all. This wider group carries a big burden, Peter says:
 If there’s a need for a coalition of countries to impose order or reduce risk in Kosovo, or Iraq, or 
Timor, or Afghanistan or Libya, or Mali, then the world looks to the Anglosphere or its allies to lead 
the task.
That’s an interesting list, but it doesn’t do much to support the importance, cohesion or effectiveness 
of the Anglosphere itself. Kosovo was NATO, with America and Britain taking very different views; 
Libya was a subset of West Europeans with grudging US support; East Timor wouldn’t have happened 
without the Southeast Asians; Mali was, well, French, and they’d probably smile if we chalk that one 
up for the Anglosphere. That leaves Afghanistan and Iraq, both significant failures. Responsibility 
for Afghanistan can be shared with others. Only Iraq, the biggest and saddest failure of them all, 
can really be attributed to the Anglosphere. Nothing to crow about there. I see no evidence that the 
Anglosphere as a group has done much useful or significant to uphold the global order recently.
And then there’s the future. The real question for those, like Abbott, who would place the Anglosphere 
at the centre of Australia’s strategic policy, is whether this grouping will do much for us in the future 
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when wealth and power will no longer be so strongly concentrated in Anglo-Saxon hands. I think in 
the end Peter acknowledges this. ‘The Anglosphere—or more accurately the international system it 
bequeathed—will remain the dominant paradigm, perhaps taking on some Chinese characteristics’.
Those are my italics. I have no idea what an Anglosphere with Chinese characteristics would look like, 
but it would not be anything Sir Robert Menzies would recognise. The italicised words thus seem to 
concede the point I was making in the passage that Peter quoted from my column—that we can no 
longer take for granted, as I think Abbott does, ‘the agreeable idea that the world should continue to 
be run from Washington and London, by people just like us’.
Originally published in The Strategist 15 July 2013.
The sun never sets on the Anglosphere
Peter Jennings
Jousting with Hugh White on international structures is both fun and a deeply Anglospheric thing to 
do, but I make no concessions about the longevity of the Anglosphere. That’s because I see the term 
as largely synonymous with the accepted global international order. The term Anglosphere is no more 
about the English than the Panama Canal is about hats. Rather it points to the historic origins of many 
of the rules of the road that structure international society. One thinks of the Monty Python sketch 
asking ‘what have the Romans ever done for us’? The list of what the Anglosphere has delivered 
includes the UN, Bretton-Woods, NATO, ANZUS, the English language, international law, support for 
human rights, the internet, fast food and precision-guided munitions. Oh yes, and they brought peace 
after World War II, which is the basis for—among many other benefits—economic growth in Asia.
Hugh asks: ‘whether this grouping will do much for us in the future when wealth and power will no 
longer be so strongly concentrated in Anglo-Saxon hands,’ but the critical point is not ethnicity but 
rather the framework of international rules. The willingness of the group of nations that subscribe to 
those rules to intervene in conflicts to protect international order is, however, an important feature of 
the broader Anglospheric approach to international society. No other combination of states is likely 
to provide such an international order-setting orientation any time soon. This is a much broader point 
than simply acknowledging the military capabilities of the five eyes countries and their like-minded 
friends—as both Hugh and I do.
To the extent that China buys into the current international system, Anglospheric approaches to 
maintaining order will prevail. A China that pluralises, abides by international law, trades freely 
and respects human rights will be, to use Hugh’s term, a China that’s agreeably ‘just like us’. There 
are many indicators that China is precisely on this journey and few to suggest that it rejects the 
international order. But if it did, that would present more than just a threat to Washington’s position 
as a world leader; it would undermine many core ways of living that Australians, and indeed most 
people, are attached or aspire to.
In this sense we’re all Anglospherical now. Oh, and the Anglosphere with Chinese characteristics? 
How about Singapore—it’s not that hard to imagine.
Originally published in The Strategist 16 July 2013.
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The Anglosphere and Tony Abbott
Graeme Dobell
Tony Abbott has sworn off talking about the Anglosphere because the responses are too Pavlovian. 
Too late.
The Liberal Leader is destined to wear the Anglosphere label with the same mixed results that John 
Howard had with that Deputy Sheriff badge. But Abbott will lose little sleep over the dogs barking 
and biting: standing with Howard, the US alliance and the military and economic traditions of 
Anglo-American history will suit him admirably.
We venture into Anglosphere territory because of the fine work of Hugh White and Peter Jennings; it’s 
always stimulating to see two top players at the top of their game, going for it at top speed. See their 
Strategist exchanges.
Rather than getting too close to the cut and thrust of these two superb semantic swordsmen, I’ll 
approach the Anglosphere through three columns: Abbot, Oz voters and what the Anglosphere offers 
in thinking about the Asia Century or the Indo Pacific Age. This first effort is about Tony because he, 
single-handedly, has injected the term into Oz politics.
Tony Abbott believes in the Anglosphere, as he made clear in his book Battlelines. For a witty version 
of why the Anglosphere works for Abbott, read his Oxford speech7 on how he was formed by studying 
there as a Rhodes Scholar.
The strongest foreign policy element in the address is his aside giving the Anglosphere an Asian tinge:
 As with all the countries that think and argue among themselves in English (that these days 
include Singapore and Hong Kong, Malaysia and even India), what we have in common is usually 
more important than anything that divides us.
The jests are elegant, in an Anglo sort of way, especially his musing that one reason Bill Clinton 
(another Rhodes scholar) experimented with the smoking of exotic weed during his studies was 
‘because the Rhodes House no smoking signs were in Latin!’
See also the wonderful line from the historian of the Conservative Party, Lord Blake, passing 
judgement on Tony’s student performance: ‘Mr Abbott needs to temper his robust common sense 
with a certain philosophic doubt’. Oz voters will get their Lord Blake moment later this year.
Shortly after that Oxford speech, Tony Walker asked Abbott8 whether he would exclude the word 
‘Anglosphere’ from his political vocabulary, irrespective of his attachment to that world view. This 
was the laughing Abbott reply: ‘Whenever that term is used it tends to prompt a Pavlovian reaction 
and it’s best not to prompt Pavlovian reactions if you can avoid it’.
Abbott has been able to watch the Pavlovian responses from Kevin Rudd, Paul Keating and, notably, 
Bob Carr, who made the Anglosphere the closing stanza of his recent foreign policy roundup9 to the 
Press Club:
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 Tony Abbott has spoken many times about the Anglosphere, the importance of the Anglosphere 
to him. He did it in his book, where he is not constrained by the obligation to prove he’s not a 
fire-breathing right-winger. He spoke about the Anglosphere more frequently and forcefully. I 
value very highly the comfort in our relations with other English-speaking democracies and it 
means a great deal to Australia, those relationships… For a conservative minister of Australia who 
had once been in tutelage of John Howard, talk of Anglosphere is very dangerous. It sends a very 
wrong message about where Australia is, the character of our country, the content of our foreign 
policy. And I would enter a very strong warning about that. A lot of it, a lot of the interpretation 
placed on that, were it to happen, might be wrong or unfair, but source considered, comments 
about an Anglosphere could be widely, wildly misinterpreted and do Australia great harm.
It may be ‘wrong and unfair’, to use the Carr phrase, but expect the Foreign Minister to keep probing 
right there with a sharp knife. Abbott needs to look no further than his hero and mentor John Howard 
to see that even labels you embrace can be twisted into badges of shame by critics.
The Howard ‘deputy sheriff’ meme is a great example. The fine journalist and fine man Fred Brenchley 
pinned the badge on Howard in an interview for The Bulletin in September, 1999, as Australia led the 
intervention in East Timor. Fred put the descriptor to Howard and the Prime Minister—to his lasting 
regret—accepted it.
What’s lost to memory and subsequent redefinition is that Howard, at that momentous moment, 
was embracing the image of sheriff rather than deputy. The PM had been deeply disappointed by the 
tardy response of the Clinton administration to the gathering storm in East Timor. For Howard, this 
was the most difficult period in relations with the US during the dozen years of his government. What 
he was embracing in his interview with Brenchley was the idea that Australia could take the lead in 
confronting security challenges in its own region—in other words, an image of Australian leadership 
not deputyship. That’s why the headline on the Brenchley piece was ‘The Howard Defence Doctrine’. 
Imagine Howard’s lasting chagrin, then, that the ‘deputy sheriff’ designation has become derisive 
shorthand for the depiction of Australia as a US lackey; granted Iraq added a lot of substance to 
the perspective.
The number of times I’ve heard ‘deputy sheriff’ thrown up in argument in all sorts of forums across 
Asia leads me to conclude that for many in the region it’s the defining two word description of Howard 
foreign policy—and, often, for Australian strategic policy. The new version would have us acting as 
‘deputy marines’.
The deputy sheriff label held an element of truth for a loyal ally, but it could also be loaded with toxin. 
Whether for purposes of love or loathing, the Anglosphere is now a medal permanently pinned to 
Tony Abbott. The next column will consider what that means for the voters of Oz.
Originally published in The Strategist 17 July 2013.
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What’s at the centre (center?) of the Anglosphere?
Andrew Smith
The recent exchanges between Peter Jennings, Hugh White and Nic Stuart over the existence and 
value of the ‘Anglosphere’ have been both entertaining and timely. I’ve found things to agree with 
in all their contributions but tend to come down on Peter’s side. The term characterises as well as 
anything the origins of the current international order—the maintenance of which is very much in 
Australia’s interest.
I also agree with both Peter and Hugh that, from a Defence perspective, membership of the 
Anglosphere’s inner sanctum, the ‘Five Eyes’ club has been hugely advantageous to Australia. But 
Hugh’s characterisation of the Five Eyes as simply an intelligence-sharing relationship doesn’t do 
it justice—it’s much more significant than that—not only for its members, but for the ‘Anglosphere 
Plus’ (NATO and Japan) which Peter alludes to. It also demonstrates one of the fundamentals of the 
Anglosphere—the indispensability of US leadership—and in doing so creates a challenge to its own 
exclusivity, as well as opportunities and responsibilities for Australia.
While I agree with the essential likemindedness that Peter claims for the Five Eyes, the group is 
much less a quintipartite band of equals than it is four bilateral relationships with the US flying in 
close formation. Without the US, the other four would likely be crosseyed. Yet they get more from 
America strategically than America does from them. In Australia’s case, this includes not only access 
to technology and intelligence but also, over the last decade, the chance to fill senior and prominent 
roles in US-led coalitions, often disproportionate to our contributions of other, costlier capabilities. 
Achieving priceless experience for ADF personnel as well as profile with our principal ally is a great 
deal for Australia.
The other junior partners do the same, but this can be divisive of the wider coalition, especially ‘old 
NATO’ countries who are jealous of the Five Eyes’ exclusivity. The danger for the Five Eyes members—
particularly the US—is that however comfortable they are working together, usually they won’t 
combine enough military wherewithal or international legitimacy to get the job done. Afghanistan’s 
a case in point, which the US had to reinvent as a NATO mission. Looming problems in the Gulf are 
another: Australia will never put a carrier group through the Straits of Hormuz. But France can (and 
recently has), as well as being proactive in Mali. Yet France can’t command the same relationship 
with the USA—something which frustrates it and, no doubt, makes it harder for Hollande to support 
Anglospheric goals.
This isn’t to say that Australia should relinquish its hard-earned place in the inner sanctum. Rather, 
it might be time to consider admitting others to that exclusive club. We should also use our position 
to build cohesion in that part of the Anglosphere Plus that, realistically, will never be among ‘the 
few’. We bring some real capacity to that role: most countries see us as a good international citizen, 
with much less historical or relationship baggage than many others. We can really assist the US in its 
leadership role, if we are a little selfless. This might require us to continue to engage, judiciously, well 
outside our near region, even after 2014. Given our stake in global security, albeit as a regional power, 
that isn’t too much to ask.
Originally published in The Strategist 18 July 2013.
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The Anglosphere and the China choice
Andrew Davies
Like many of our readers, I’ve been following the recent discussion of the nature of the Anglosphere 
with interest. It’s been a lively exchange—and sometimes a wry one—and it sheds some light on 
aspects of our strategic culture that we usually take for granted. But ultimately I think we’ve been 
dancing around the key issue while having fun with definitions.
Whether ‘Anglosphere’ is a good word for the established world order is a subsidiary issue which we 
can leave for another time. The real question is what is happening to the world order, whether we’re 
likely to see a significant challenge to it in the foreseeable future and what our response should be if 
there is.
There’s no doubt from the exchange so far that all of the contributors agree that there are plenty 
of reasons for Australia to value the current world order. After all, it’s left us sitting fat and happy 
at the top of the heap. As inheritors of the global trading and financial system that’s largely an 
Anglo-American construct, we’ve successfully traded our way to prosperity. And along the way 
we’ve learned to love the military doctrine that goes along with it; God bless those Sea Lines 
of Communication.
There’s no question that we’d like things to stay the same—or as close to it as possible. And for as long 
as the cost of keeping the status quo is low, I think our major protagonists in Hugh White and Peter 
Jennings would be in firm agreement that it’s a strategy worth pursuing. The crux of the argument—
and where I think they part company—is what happens when the cost becomes higher. Peter argues 
that he sees little evidence of that:
 A China that pluralises, abides by international law, trades freely and respects human rights will 
be, to use Hugh’s term, a China that’s agreeably ‘just like us’. There are many indicators that China 
is precisely on this journey and few to suggest that it rejects the international order.
Hugh, I think, is less sanguine, and thinks that there’s a real prospect that China will attempt to 
rewrite the world order in a way that goes beyond an easily accommodated ‘Singaporisation’ of the 
Anglo-American order.
I put these thoughts to Hugh, and this was his emailed response:
 After the Cold War it seemed to many—though not to me—that the world order was now accepted 
by all the big players, so it would last for ever; hence ‘the end of history’. Then some folk thought 
that al Qaeda was the biggest or only challenge it faced. Now it’s becoming clearer to more people 
that China doesn’t accept it, and has the power to contest it if it wants to. But the scale of China’s 
challenge is still not agreed. Indeed the big division in the debate, including in our Anglosphere 
debate is between those who take China’s challenge to the status quo seriously, and those who 
think it can be ignored or faced down at low cost.
 To those who think it isn’t to be taken too seriously—which I think includes Peter and many 
others, including the Government and the Opposition, and most Americans—unflinching defence 
of the status quo is a no brainer.
 For those of us who do take it seriously—and I do—the response is much more complex. Do we 
cave in, fight back or a bit of both? And the answer isn’t black and white, but grey all over. It isn’t 
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so much do we fight back or cave in, but how much change do we accept, and what do we refuse 
to compromise on? And that depends on the costs and risks of compromise on different issues 
versus the costs and risks of resistance on those issues. These are the vital questions to those who 
take China’s challenge seriously, but to those who don’t, the calculus is much easier.
 So first we need to debate whether the World Order (or Anglosphere if we prefer) really does face a 
serious challenge or not. Then, if we decide it does, we have to debate how to respond.
 So yes, this idea is worth exploring—which is why I’ve written a book about it. Because this is 
precisely what The China Choice is all about.
Originally published in The Strategist 22 July 2013.
The Anglosphere and Oz
Graeme Dobell
Australia’s referendum tick for the monarchy and constant opinion poll support for the US alliance10 
suggest the voters are happy with both the traditional and treaty elements of the Anglosphere. The 
temperature of popular sentiment must carry weight in The Strategist‘s discussion of the significance 
of the Anglosphere, but I suspect that few Australians would reach for ‘The Anglosphere’ as their 
preferred term to describe our present situation or future strategic choices.
Sentiment always counts, and often glitters on the surface, but it can conceal a much larger seam 
of pragmatic Oz self-interest. The hard-headed view of self-interest is one constant in an Australia 
that’s changed dramatically since Elizabeth II took the throne in 1952. Looking back, it’s legitimate 
to observe—in the words of Tony Abbott’s former Jesuit teacher11—that in the earlier versions of 
the Australian nation, ‘the English made the laws, the Scots made the money, and the Irish made 
the songs’!
The jest needs updating in the Australia revealed by the 2011 census12, where Mandarin is the second 
most common language after English. Others in the top ten ‘Languages Spoken at Home’ include 
Arabic, Cantonese, Vietnamese, Hindi and Tagalog. The Australian home has become a place of many 
languages. The new version of the Jesuit quip might be that China drives the Oz mining boom while 
all manner of Chinese Australians bloom; the Vietnamese drive the roads but Vietnamese medicos 
also drive the hospitals; the Indians drive both the trains and the law—and everybody runs the 
restaurants. The range of languages to be found round an average Oz kitchen table lessens the power 
of the Anglosphere as a cultural frame that Tony Abbott can use to talk to voters. Worse than Abbott’s 
worry about the Anglosphere provoking Pavlovian responses, it might rate as an irrelevance. No 
wonder Abbott has vowed to stop talking about the Anglosphere.
As I argued in the previous column, the Anglosphere is a medal that Abbott will have to wear, for 
good or ill, in the way he is viewed beyond Oz. Within Australia, the medal will do him no great harm 
because of the relatively positive views about monarchy and US Marines and many other Australian 
habits of mind. No harm, though, doesn’t mean it will help Abbott electorally. The diverse range of 
Australians who also speak Mandarin or Hindi or Tagalog might view the Anglosphere as another 
of those bits of the Oz psyche that make the place both unique and amusing. Examples of these 
Oz peccadilloes include having a head of state who lives on the other side of the world, the local 
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habit of shooting and eating the animal which also hops along as the national symbol and being so 
multi-cultural that we have four codes of football.
In any discussion like this, I often reach for one of my favourite quotes from the leading Asian 
scholar, Wang Gungwu, who embraced Oz (and burnished Australia’s standing) by taking Australian 
citizenship. As Professor Wang observed twenty years ago, Australia’s liberal history gives it 
something special to contribute to the region: ‘Paradoxically, what Australians value about their 
culture: the law, the respect for human rights, the parliamentary system, which are not features of 
Asian societies, are what attract Asians’. That attraction’s reflected in the diversity of peoples who 
have embraced Oz, peccadilloes and all.
There are two sorts of people in the world: those who like to divide the world into two and those who 
don’t. For the sake of The Strategist discussion of the Anglosphere, let us do some ‘two sorting’. This 
debate can be divided in lots of ways: as a discussion of both modes of order and competition; or of 
aspects of both grand strategy and geo-economics; but the sharpest way to posit two halves of the 
Anglosphere is to see it as fundamental to the international Rules of the Road (as Peter Jennings did) 
and, secondly, to see the distinctly Anglosphere Ways of War.
On the Rules of the Road side of the divide, Oz voters would probably reach beyond the Anglosphere 
to adopt more common terms such as liberal internationalism, globalisation or capitalism. These 
other terms all carry large amounts of baggage, but though they may be deeply Anglo in flavour, 
they at least don’t have Anglo on the label. When we turn to the other half—to geostrategy or Ways of 
War—the discussion and the stakes really get pointed and come to the fundamental point; this is the 
sharp point of the slashing semantic swordplay between Hugh and Peter.
The demographer Bernard Salt13 spends a lot of time studying the Australian psyche. I point to 
his argument that Australians today don’t consider themselves to be the victims of ‘the tyranny of 
distance’ in the same way as earlier generations. The emotional ties to England and the cultural 
cringe have faded. What still worries Australians, he argues, is ‘Empty Island syndrome’. Salt writes14 
that the Empty Island fear is that we’re a small nation in charge of a big empty continent, and that 
makes us both lucky and vulnerable:
 Australians, I think, are united across space and time, including centuries, by the abiding notion 
that we are modest in number and we live on a big and empty island. Indeed Empty Island 
Syndrome delivered our early and lingering cultural cringe and deference to Britain, the US 
and Europe.
Empty Island syndrome throws some light on why asylum seekers sailing into Australian waters have 
caused such an extraordinary neuralgia in the Oz body politic. And if we’re united across centuries, 
then the Anglosphere still offers some interesting thoughts about Australia’s future approach to Ways 
of War in the Asian Century—the subject for the next column.
Originally published in The Strategist 23 July 2013.
Strategic Insights 17
The Anglocybersphere
Peter Jennings
Bang on time to complement ASPI’s extended debate about the Anglosphere, a senior dialogue 
of Homeland Security Ministers from the five eyes countries (the US, UK, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand) was held this week at the US Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California. This 
was the first meeting of such a gathering, described by the US Secretary of Homeland Security15 
Janet Napolitano as an opportunity to discuss closer collaboration on the ‘cybersecurity of critical 
infrastructure, countering violent extremism, and data exchange initiatives’. She added:
 While each topic holds its own challenges, they all require close collaboration in order to build our 
collective ability to identify and mitigate threats that transcend our physical borders. … I see the 
Five Country Ministerial as a singular forum in which cross-cutting issues will inform discussions 
on how our five countries can collectively achieve the optimal balance of mobility and security.
Australia’s Home Affairs Minister Jason Clare attending the meeting and in a rather low key media 
release16 said that he had agreed in a meeting last year with Napolitano to establish the forum. This 
joins a regular five eyes meeting of Attorneys General, the last of which was held in New Zealand 
last May.
While many might wish it to be otherwise, the fact remains that the Anglosphere (call it the five eyes 
relationship if you prefer) simply keeps on delivering useful practical security cooperation between 
its members and their closer friends. It’s an association built on real delivery, rather than an artificial 
construct—like a concert of Asia would be—which sounds great in theory but struggles to grain 
traction in reality.
Napolitano’s opening remarks at Monterey also offered an interesting insight into how a five-eyes 
construct has the capacity to shape the international behaviour of a larger number of actors:
 Working closely together, we have a unique opportunity and capacity to develop common 
international standards and approaches to security issues, and promote these among other 
foreign partners.
There’s more substance to this than just the niceties of opening a meeting. By developing shared 
policy approaches, the five-eyes countries will have a disproportionate impact on the behaviours of 
other states in international discussions on cyber security and other non-defence security issues. 
This certainly has the potential to shape outcomes at gatherings such as the Seoul Conference 
on Cyberspace17, which aims to build international political momentum for collaboration on 
cyber-security. Thus does one of the newest challenges in security—how to build an international 
framework for cyber collaboration—benefit from one of the oldest strategic constructs, 
the Anglosphere.
Originally published in The Strategist 26 July 2013.
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Anglosphere Ways of War and the Asian Century (part 1)
Graeme Dobell
Consider this definition of the ‘Ways of War of the Anglosphere’ as the workings of a military and 
maritime mindset, powering a methodology that has fundamentally shaped the globe:
 The Anglosphere, the group of countries where English is the native language of a substantial 
majority of the population and where social values and culture are largely shaped by Anglo-Saxon 
values, remains an important fact of world politics. Canada, Australia and New Zealand fought 
alongside Britain in both world wars from start to finish; all the English-speaking nations fought 
in the Cold War as well. Australia is the only country in the world which sent military forces to 
fight side by side with the Americans in the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict and the two wars 
with Iraq.
The words are from Walter Russell Mead, in his book ‘God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making 
of the Modern World’, which offers a rendering of the Anglosphere that is so unsentimental as to be 
steel-tipped. Think of a phenomenon that is pragmatic, even ruthless in operation, while juiced by 
liberal optimism. Mead can’t resist the family metaphor—while the Anglosphere is about profit as 
much as power, it must be seen as a family firm:
 For roughly three centuries now the English-speaking peoples have been more or less 
continuously organising, managing, expanding, and defending a global system of power, finance, 
culture, and trade. The British branch of the family held the majority of shares and furnished the 
firm’s leadership up through World War II; since then, the American branch has the lead…For 
better or worse, the family business is the dominant force in international life today, and looks set 
to remain the foundation of world order for some time to come.
That last sentence about the Anglosphere continuing as the foundation of world order is roughly 
where Tony Abbott sits, and is the point of departure for the argument The Strategist has 
been running.
Mead’s family analogy is useful because the attendant realities of large families are mistrust, envy, 
anger and argument. This is a ruthless family that combines a ‘unique mix of cynicism and faith’. 
Mead calls Franklin Roosevelt the most Anglophobic American president of the 20th Century: while 
loudly and enthusiastically proclaiming solidarity with Churchill and the Brits during the war, FDR 
also ensured, as John Maynard Keynes put it, that the US would ‘pick the eyes out of the British 
Empire’. FDR aimed to help Britain win the world war while ensuring Britain lost its supreme place in 
the world. If those at the heart of the Anglosphere can do that to their closest kith and kin, imagine 
what they can dish out to everyone else.
The latest version of this family saga is John Howard, hearing the Anglosphere drums, following a dud 
president into a disastrous war; or, as Mead observes of the British experience with George W. and 
Iraq: ‘Tony Blair was not the first Anglo-American leader to discover that the special relationship can 
be a millstone around the neck rather than an anchor in stormy seas’.
To relate all this to The Strategist’s discussion, it’s clear that China has been closely studying the 
Protocols of the Elders of Greenwich. Beijing doesn’t have to buy the belief that God is a Liberal. A 
long Anglo history of hypocrisy, humbug and greed means there’s plenty of truth in the jibe that the 
early agents of the Anglosphere kept the Sabbath religiously, and everything else they could lay their 
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hands on. But if the system isn’t divinely ordained, it has displayed a ruthless longevity that compels 
respect. China can see clearly the power of open societies and open trade, because it’s striving to 
create a semi-open society with closed politics, while seeking all the benefits of open trade.
China does accept some of the international Rules of the Road, especially on the economic side. The 
dozen arduous years Beijing spent negotiating its way into the World Trade Organisation is profound 
proof of this. But, while understanding the Anglosphere tradition, China does not have to like the 
liberal internationalist principles that fuel this version of trade, even as it can take a deeply pragmatic 
satisfaction in joining the game and playing it with huge success.
China can drive as fast as the trade traffic will allow and pay little heed to any calls to help police the 
roads. As China stands on the threshold of taking the top spot from the US on the economic ladder, 
these are Rules of the Road that have truly delivered, even if they are written in English.
But the Rules of the Road are only one aspect of the Anglospheric tradition. The other is the 
Anglosphere way of War. Even there, and despite thousands of years of their own ways of war, there 
are signs that the Chinese are following—a point I’ll return to tomorrow.
Originally published in The Strategist 30 July 2013.
Anglosphere Ways of War and the Asian Century (part 2)
Graeme Dobell
I explained yesterday how the Chinese have thoroughly digested the Anglosphere’s Rules of the Road, 
and have steered themselves to prosperity in the process. The Anglosphere Ways of War are equally 
well understood. Indeed, China is embracing one of the central laws of the Elders of Greenwich: 
the top dog has to put to sea. The British adopted the naval strategy pioneered by the Dutch and 
then sailed out to build a global empire. The US took over the sea strategy and still presides as the 
maritime mega-power. If the Obama pivot is to mean anything long term in Asia, it will be based on 
the US delivering as the off-shore naval balancer in the region, in the same way as the Britain did 
for Europe.
Mead argues that the emergence of a multipolar international system in Asia is an extraordinary 
opportunity for the US and its maritime system:
 The interests of the key Asian powers appear to be aligned with those of the US and of the liberal 
capitalist order; American interests are never more secure than when multiple pillars support 
the system… The offshore balancing power that is interested in an open global trading system 
poses less threat and offers more opportunity to more partners than traditional land powers can 
usually match.
Mark China as the traditional land power that understands this argument and is responding 
accordingly. On this, see Sam Roggeveen’s piece18 noting the view that ‘China has ticked the “sea 
denial” box, and is moving on to more ambitious blue water plans’. The military element of the US 
rebalance must pivot on maritime strategy. The response from China is plenty of naval pushback. 
The quandary for other Asian players is the extent to which they can do the Anglo dance in support of 
the US.
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The Australian public shows every sign of grasping the shape and direction of these currents. The 
2013 Lowy Institute survey of Australian public opinion on foreign policy19 suggests the voters still 
love the security elements embedded in the Anglosphere but are pondering the costs of the Ways of 
War. The Poll found 82% of Australians supported the US alliance (down from the Obama highpoint 
last year of 87%). The rotation of US marines through northern Australia is also popular: 61% of those 
polled were in favour of ‘allowing the US to base military forces here in Australia’ (up from 55% in 2011 
when the same question was asked). The tradition of Australia fervently clinging to the alliance lives, 
but it’s the potential demands of the alliance that are troubling.
The George W. Iraq effect lingers: 76% of Australians think that ‘Australia should only support US 
military action if it is authorised by the United Nations’. And only 38% agreed with the proposition 
that Australia should support ‘US military action in Asia, for example, in a conflict between China 
and Japan’. So Australians like the alliance as much as ever, but aren’t too keen on doing any alliance 
heavy duty, especially as China is seen as far more important economically than the US. The Lowy 
survey reports it this way:
 The prospect of strategic competition between a rising China and the United States has stirred a 
debate in recent years about whether it is possible for Australia to maintain good relations with 
both nations. An overwhelming majority of Australians believe this is possible (87%). Only 12% 
think it is ‘not possible for Australia to have a good relationship with China and a good relationship 
with the United States at the same time’. Most Australians (76%) see China as the most important 
economy to Australia at the moment, far more than the 16% who say the United States economy 
is the most important. Given this strong emphasis on the Chinese economy, we asked this year 
which relationship people saw as more important to Australia overall. Despite their views about 
the importance of China’s economy, more Australians place a higher value on our relationship 
with the United States (48%) than with China (37%). Without being prompted, 10% offered the 
response that both were equally important. Even of those three-quarters of Australians who 
believe that China’s economy is the most important to Australia, a significant minority (40%) 
still think that the relationship with the United States is more important to Australia than the 
relationship with China.
Australians have great affection for the American cousins but the scars of Iraq and Afghanistan are 
fresh (61% of those polled by Lowy thought the Afghanistan war ‘was not worth fighting’).
The voters have accepted that China has become supremely good at playing by the economic Rules of 
the Road. And Australians join the rest of the region in praying that the US and China can continue to 
motor along without any major traffic accidents.
Australians are happy with much that the Anglosphere has wrought, but aren’t so sure whether we 
should fight for it on traditional Anglosphere terms in the Asian Century. The climate of opinion is not 
to fight at all or to do so only with UN blessing. That’s a reading of the Australian mood that will cause 
some head scratching in the place where the Anglosphere holds greatest sway in Oz—the traditionally 
Anglo-Saxon ranks of the Australian military.
Originally published in The Strategist 31 July 2013.
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